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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last several decades, the public has shifted its concern for
local environmental issues to international environmental issues.1 This
shift in public concern can be attributed to the increase in global
pollution as the world industrializes.2 With this shift, there has been a
sudden increase in the number of multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) entered into amongst the nations of the world to address rising
global pollution. 3 Current MEAs cover numerous environmental issues,
ranging from the seas and migratory species to hazardous wastes and
chemicals, and include multiple states as parties. The adoption of MEAs
evidences a consensus among the international community that
environmental issues must be addressed. While the adoption of MEAs is
a positive and critical step toward protecting the environment on a
global level, the adoption of MEAs is only one step in a large process.
It is estimated that there are approximately 900 international
in
issues of
environmental
thattheaddress
in effect
currently
agreements
5 However,
in the number
drastic increase
despite
whole or inpart.
MEAs entered into in recent years, "the ecological problems that these
treaties were meant to solve persists." 6 Thus, the creation of MEAs
1. See Frank Stahler, Some Reflections on Multilateral Environmental Agreements 4
(Kiel Inst. for the World Econ., Working Paper No. 647, 1994).
2. See Michael J. Kelly, Overcoming Obstacles to the Effective Implementation of
InternationalEnvironmentalAgreements, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REV. 447, 447 (1997).
3. See Renata Rubian & Lynn Wagner, Summary Report of the High-Level Meeting on
Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral EnvironmentalAgreements: 21-22 January
2006, MEA ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE MEETING BULL. (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.,
Ottawa, Canada) Jan. 25, 2006, at 463.
4. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 371
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011).
5. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 448.
6. Id.
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alone has not served to protect the international environment, but has
only shown that the international community agrees that certain
environmental issues must be addressed. 7
International environmental law experts have expressed the opinion
that states' implementation of MEAs is largely negated by their lack of
willingness to enforce the agreements they have entered into. 8 Further,
the international community has voiced concern that current MEAs are
neither being complied with nor enforced and that such failures "are one
of the leading causes for the continued degradation of the
environment." 9 Despite the failures of states to abide by MEAs, "given
the current structure of the international community, treaty based
regimes are the most effective context in which to deal with thorny
environmental challenges on a global scale." 10 Thus, to complete the
process of protecting the environment on an international level requires
full implementation and enforcement of current and future MEAs. Once
compliance is reached, the international community can move forward
in the process of bettering the global environment.
If the environmental issues that MEAs seek to address are to be dealt
with successfully, a method of enforcing MEAs must be found." Most
existing methods of enforcing international environmental law are
"slow, cumbersome, expensive, uncoordinated and uncertain." 1 2 The
international community lacks an all-encompassing institution to
address noncompliance with MEAs. 3 This causes specific concern in
the context of environmental issues because
nearly all environmental
14
harm is time-sensitive and irreversible.
II. OBSTACLES

TO ENFORCING MULTILATERAL

ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

To find a solution to the problem of enforcing MEAs, it is necessary
7.

Id.

8. See Rubian & Wagner, supra note 3, at 465.
9. Id. at 463.
10. Kelly, supra note 2, at 448.
11. Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make InternationalEnvironmental Law, 86 Am.J.
INT'L L. 259, 259 (1992).

12. Id.Palmer found that current methods of addressing international environmental
issues are ineffective stating: "Something better must be found if the environmental challenges
the world faces are to be dealt with successfully. Nearly twenty years afler the Stockholm
Declaration, we still lack the institutional and legal mechanisms to deal effectively with
transboundary and biospheric degradation." Id.
13. Seeid.
14. See Teresa A. Berwick, Responsibility and Liabilityfor Environmental Damage: A
Roadmap for InternationalEnvironmental Regimes, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 257, 265
(1997-98).
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to address the obstacles that currently stand in the way of enforceability.
While there are several obstacles that impede the enforcement of MEAs,
one of the major obstacles is "the congestion of too many agFreements
that result in uncoordinated and piecemeal application."' Another
major obstacle impeding MEA enforcement is the relationship between
sovereign states and international non-governmental organizations
6
(NGOs) that is inherent in international environmental agreements.'
A. Obstacle of Treaty Congestion
One of the main obstacles to enforcing MEAs results from treaty
congestion. 17 "Treaty congestion" is a result of the overwhelming
number of environmental treaties that have been created since 1972.'4
Due to the high number of international environmental agreements,
"there is a great potential for the additional inefficiency of overlapping
provisions in agreements, inconsistencies in obligations, significant
gaps in coverage, and duplication of goals and responsibilities."' 19 This
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that many international
environmental agreements create dispute resolution procedures with
separate tribunals. 20 Thus, where international disputes involve different
areas of international law, situations often arise where more than one
international tribunal may hear one dispute.
The problems caused by treaty congestion are partially addressed by
the Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention provides rules for the
formation, application, and interpretation of treaties, and states that
"where treaties overlap, the later in time rule generally operates for
similar provisions ... However, since most modern environmental
treaties are global, they are also necessarily multilateral, and there is
little chance
that all of the parties to the numerous agreements are the
22
same.
A proposed solution to the problem of treaty congestion in enforcing
MEAs has been to develop one supranational governing body with the
3
ability
binding
decisions.
are
opposedtoto impose
the creation
of such
a forum, However,
as it would many
infringestates
on their
15. Id.
16. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 482-83.
17. Id at458.
18. Id.
19. Edith Brown Weiss, InternationalEnvironmentalLaw: ContemporaryIssues and the
Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 699 (1993).
20. Kelly, supra note 2, at 459.
21. See Ishaya Paul Amaza, Multiplicity of International Dispute Settlement Forums:
Avoiding the Risk of ParallelProceedings,6 Disp. RESOL. INT'L 149, 150 (2012).
22. Kelly, supra note 2, at 459.
23. Id. at 459-60.
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sovereignty. 24 The larger and more powerful nations appear to have a
"consensus among governments that the creation of new institutions
25
should be avoided when possible.,
Due to the amount of MEAs that are currently in place, causing
treaty congestion, the problem of noncompliance must be addressed in
another manner. Furthermore, as the number of MEAs increase, the
problem of treaty congestion will necessarily persist. While the creation
of a supranational governing body may be ahead of its time, and
therefore not a realistic solution, parties to MEAs may be better served
by looking to established forums to ensure compliance.
B. Obstacle of Collective Management
Another primary obstacle to enforcing MEAs results from the
problem of collective management. International environmental action
is generally driven by political will to solve or address a current
international issue. 2 6 As a result, "[t]here is an inescapable connection
between the international community, constructed of nation-states, and
the collection of politics, economics, and social pressures driving those
states to take [action]. 2 7 This connection results in "collective
management," where solutions to international environmental issues
require international organizations and governments to work together
"with NGOs acting in an advisory capacity from the sidelines." The
problem with collective management arises here-while NGOs are
often the most supportive of international environmental issues, they
are
29
not able to participate in disputes regarding MEA noncompliance.
States continue to enter into MEAs while international
environmental problems persist because of noncompliance. 30 However,
NGOs, such as financial institutions whose investments are threatened
by environmental degradation focus their time, energy, and resources
on solving these problems. 3 ? In addition to solving environmental
issues, NGO participation in international environmental issues also
brings public32awareness to the issues and may lead to social pressure for
states to act.
NGOs should be able to participate directly in issues arising under
noncompliance with MEAs for these reasons. Although NGOs are not
24.

Id.at 46O.

25.
26.
27.

Palmer, supra note 11, at 282.
See Kelly, supra note 2, at 482.
Id.

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.at 482-83.
See id.
at 485.
Rubian & Wagner, supra note 3, at 463.
See Kelly, supra note 2, at 487.

32.

Id.
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able to directly participate in international environmental law, they
serve an important role in enforcing MEAs. As environmental issues
directly impact many NGOs, NGOs commit substantial resources to
solving environmental issues and, in turn, have a large stake in their
outcome. Additionally, NGO involvement in international issues brings
public awareness, resulting in pressure from the public to their states to
comply with existing MEAs.
III. METHODS OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Currently, there are few established methods to enforce compliance
with international law. 33 While almost all MEAs provide methods for
settling disputes under the agreements, these methods are rarely used.3 4
Unlike individuals who are sanctioned for violating the laws of their
nation, states, as sovereign entities, have no higher international
35
authority to answer to when they violate an international law.
A. Informal Non-Binding DisputeResolution in Multilateral
EnvironmentalAgreements
Traditionally, MEAs have approached dispute resolution through the
use of informal and non-binding mechanisms. 36 Non-binding
mechanisms commonly used in MEAs include, among others,
negotiation and mediation. In negotiations, the parties to the dispute
attempt to reach a settlement that is agreeable to both sides by working
with one another. 37 There is little information available on the success
of MEA dispute resolution through negotiation because such
negotiations generally occur in private and the parties do not disclose
the outcome.
In mediations, the parties to the dispute utilize the help of a neutral
third party. 39 Here, the third party will promote communication to
facilitate settlement of the dispute. As in negotiations, mediations
generally occur in private and the parties typically do not disclose the

33. See HUNTER ETAL., supra note 4, at 372.
34. See Rubian & Wagner, supra note 3, at 465.
35. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 372.
36. See Philippe Sands, Principles of InternationalEnvironmental Law, in HUNTER ET
AL., supra note 4, at 412.
37. See id. at 413.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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results of the mediation. 4 ' Further, "[t]here are few reported examples
42
of mediation being relied upon to resolve environmental disputes."
Although there is little information available on the results of
informal non-binding dispute resolution methods used in environmental
treaties, what is known is that they are not binding unless the parties to
the dispute agree .to comply with any settlement reached. Thus, parties
to MEAs who employ informal non-binding dispute resolution methods
may choose whether to accept or reject proposed settlements. 43 Under
these circumstances, parties may never resolve a dispute under a MEA
nor be required to comply with the terms of a MEA that they adopt.
B. Formal BindingDispute Resolution in Multilateral
EnvironmentalAgreements
Historically, formal binding dispute resolution procedures have not
been common practice in international environmental law. 44 This can be
attributed to the limited amount of developed binding dispute resolution
mechanisms, timeliness and cost of formal proceedings, and
45
unwillingness of states to submit to third-party jurisdiction.
Additionally, international law is based primarily on the principle of
creating peaceful relationships between states, which is inherently
opposed to using litigation to enforce obligations. 46 Although
international environmental law has not typically employed formal
procedures,
current widespread
binding
dispute resolution
noncompliance with MEAs, causing further environmental degradation,
evidences the need for new dispute resolution and enforcement
procedures.
As an alternative to informal non-binding dispute resolution
mechanisms, formal binding dispute resolution methods are becoming
increasingly favored to enforce compliance with MEAs.4 7 One method
of formal binding dispute resolution advanced includes the use of an
international tribunal to serve as a permanent court to render binding
decisions on those who come before it.48 However, despite the "calls for
court, and
its creation, there is as yet no international environmental
49
none is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future."
41.

Id.

42. Id.
43.
44.

Id. at412.
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 414.

45. Id.
46. See Saheed A. Alabi, Using Litigation to Enforce Climate Obligations under
Domestic and InternationalLaws, 3 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 209, 210-11 (2012).
47. See Sands, supra note 36, at 414.
48. Seeid at412.
49. Id.
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In place of a singular all-encompassing court, a number of smaller
international courts have been established to hear disputes on various
topics. 50 Three of the primary international tribunals that have been used
to address international environmental disputes include the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), and the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute
Settlement Body.5 1 Under these circumstances, parties may never
resolve a dispute under a MEA nor be required to comply with the terms
of a MEA that they adopt.

IV. THE INTERNATIONAL

TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE

SEA AS A SOLUTION

Despite the obstacles facing the implementation of international
environmental agreements, a solution to the problem may already exist.
To resolve disputes under the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Seas (UNCLOS), ITLOS was created.52 Under UNCLOS, states,
including those that are not a party to UNCLOS, as well as non-state
parties, may gain access to ITLOS to resolve disputes under MEAs if
they agree to do so in another treaty or agreement.53 Although ITLOS
has only been operational since 1994, it has already "established a
reputation for the expeditious and efficient management of cases...
and has made a substantial contribution to the development of
international environmental law[,] ' ,54 making it an appealing option for
current and future MEAs to address noncompliance.
A. Background: The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
In response to calls for the international community to address
ongoing pollution of the seas and conflicting legal claims over the
oceans and the seabed, the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
50.
51.

See id.
See Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the

Progressive Development of InternationalEnvironmental Law, Global Forum on International
Investment VII (Mar. 27-28, 2008) http://www.oecf.org/investment/globalforum/40311090.pdf
[hereinafter Sands, Litigating EnvironmentalDisputes].
52. See John E. Noyes, The InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 109, 111 (1998).

53. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 288(2), 291(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention]; Statute of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea arts. 20-22, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561 [hereinafter International
Tribunal].
54. Helmut Tuerk, The Contribution of the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea
to InternationalLaw, 26 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 289, 289 (2007).
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Sea convened in 1974. 5 "[The Conference] ended nine years later with
the adoption in 1982 of a constitution
56 for the seas - the United Nations
Sea.",
the
of
Law
the
on
Convention
UNCLOS, also called the "Constitution for the Oceans," contains the
first global framework established regarding the seas. 57 It "regulat[es]
all ocean space, its uses and its resources."" Following the signing of
the treaty, then-U.N. Secretary-General described UNCLOS as
"[p]ossibly the most significant legal instrument of this century[.],, 59 To
date, 164 countries and the European Union have joined UNCLOS.6 0
UNCLOS was designed to be expansive, covering all aspects of the
law of the sea in a single document. The drafters of UNCLOS
intended it to be universal, gaining the largest amount of support from
states possible, and to be ratified only in full, without reservations. 62 To
achieve these goals, much that was contained in UNCLOS was, and
certain portions continue to be, ambiguous. 63 "In this context[,] binding
compulsory dispute settlement becomes the cement which should hold
the whole structure together and guarantee its continued acceptability
and endurance for all parties. Without such provision[,] the Convention
would inevitably be interpreted and applied 64differently by different
states, even when acting entirely in good faith.,
Another reason given for the inclusion of a binding compulsory
dispute resolution process in UNCLOS was that it would discourage
noncompliance because parties to the agreement would seek to avoid
the compulsory and binding process by complying with the terms or
settling disputes peacefully amongst each other.-6 Thus, UNCLOS
55.

See The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historicalperspective),

U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (1998), availableat http://www.un.org/
depts/los/convention-agreements/convention-historical-perspective.htm#Third%20Conference
(last visited Dec. 2, 2013).
56. Id.
57. Tuerk, supra note 54, at 290.
58. Id.

59. A HistoricalPerspective, THE

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

(Apr. 14, 2013), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/conventionhistoricalpe
rspective.htm.
60. See General Information, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA
(Apr. 14, 2013), http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=8&L=0 [hereinafter ITLOS General
Information].
61. See Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems
of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 37, 38 (Jan. 1997), available at
http://j oumals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type= 1&fid= 1525012&j id=ILQ&volumel
d=46&issueld=O I&aid=1525004.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Jillaine Seymour, The International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea: A Great
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created ITLOS as a means of discouraging noncompliance with the
treaty and ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of the
treaty throughout the world.66
B. Composition of the Tribunal
ITLOS, composed of twenty-one judges, is currently the largest
international judicial body. 67 Each justice must meet very specific
qualifications set out in the founding document of ITLOS. 61 "The
a whole' must represent 'the principal legal systems of the
ITLOS 6'as
9
world."
Two of the basic qualifications for a judge of ITLOS are that the
judge possess a "reputation for fairness and integrity and [are] of
recognized competence in the field of the law of the sea."70 Each judge
is elected by the state parties to UNCLOS and serves a term of nine
years, renewable upon re-election.7 ' Judges also may not participate in
certain activities that may interfere with their impartiality.72 "Judges
may not, for example, have a financial interest in operations connected
with oceans resources or have acted as legal counsel for one of the
parties. 73
In addition to these qualifications, the judges must be from specific
geographical areas so that ITLOS is representative of the main legal
systems throughout the world.7 4 There can be only one Tribunal
member per nation at a time.75 The states parties "have agreed to elect
five judges each from Africa and Asia, four each from Latin America
and Caribbean States, as well as Western Europe and Other States, and
three from the Group of Eastern European States." 76 Additionally, a
party in any case before ITLOS may request that a judge of their
nationality hear their case. 7 7 This distribution of members of the
Tribunal ensures that the considerations of developing countries are
addressed, different legal systems are represented, and different
Mistake?, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2006) (quoting J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 185 (4th ed. 2005)).

66.

See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 290.

67.

Id. at 194.

68.
69.
70.

See Noyes, supra note 52, at 126.
Id. at 126-27 (citing Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 53, annex VI, art. 2(2)).
International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 2.

71.

See Noyes, supra note 52, at 126.

72.

See International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 7.

73.
74.

Noyes, supra note 52, at 126.
Id. at 126-27.

75.

See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 294.

76.
77.

Id.
See Noyes, supra note 52 at 127.
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357

78
geographical regions are accounted for.

C. Compulsory and BindingNature of the Tribunal
79
UNCLOS Part XV provides the process for settlement of disputes.
Part XV, article 287, provides that parties to UNCLOS may choose
from four specified fora to settle disputes concerning the interpretation
and application of UNCLOS. 80 Parties to UNCLOS may choose to
resolve disputes using either ITLOS; the United Nation's judicial
branch, the International Court of Justice (ICJ); arbitration; or special
arbitration before a panel of expert judges "[]in cases involving
fisheries, protection of the marine environment, marine scientific
research, and navigation[.] ' ' 81 The options provided in Article 287 are
the result of "[]states' inability, during UNCLOS[,] to agree on a single
third-party forum to which recourse should
be had when informal
82
dispute."
a
resolve
to
failed
mechanisms
The decisions made by any of the four fora available under
UNCLOS are legally binding upon the parties to the dispute. 83 As
UNCLOS does not allow parties to make reservations when joining and
these compulsory dispute settlement procedures are included in
UNCLOS, parties must to follow them and are bound to the decisions of
the tribunal that settle their dispute. 84 For non-party states and non-state
parties who agree, by treaty or otherwise, to submit to the jurisdiction of
ITLOS, "[t]he decision of the Tribunal
85 is final and shall be complied
with by all the parties to the dispute.'
Failure of a party to a dispute before ITLOS to respond or appear
does not prevent the proceedings from going forward. 86 Additionally, all
decisions issued by ITLOS are final. 7 "However, the Rules of the
Tribunal make provision
regarding requests for the interpretation or
88
revision of a judgment."
Decisions issued by ITLOS, while binding and final, are only
binding upon those parties to the dispute for which the decision is

78.

See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 294.

79.

See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 53, pt. XV.

80.

See Noyes, supra note 52, at 119.

81.

Id.

82.

Id. at 121.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 33.
86.

Id. art. 12.

87.

GeneralInformation, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA (Dec.

7, 2013), http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=8&L=0%252525255CoOpensinternallinkincurrent

window.
88. Id.
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rendered. 89 Therefore, each dispute heard by ITLOS is decided on the
unique facts of each case and will not be guided by previous decisions.
Additionally, while decisions issued by ITLOS are not binding outside
the parties to the particular dispute, each decision "may be quite
significant for the development of the law of the sea in general, and
may,9 0in addition, influence the future interpretation of this body of
law."

D. Jurisdictionof the Tribunal
"[T]he jurisdiction of the Tribunal is relatively unique in comparison
to other international judicial bodies." 91 ITLOS was primarily created to
hear claims brought by state parties concerning the interpretation and
application of UNCLOS. 92 "In the cases submitted to the Tribunal to
date the following matters have figured prominently: prompt release of
vessels and crews under article 292 of the Convention, coastal State
jurisdiction in its maritime zones, freedom of navigation, hot pursuit,
marine environment, flags of convenience and conservation of fish
stocks." 93 ITLOS may also hear disputes between parties that are not
state-members of UNCLOS if they submit to the jurisdiction of
ITLOS. 94
States that are not parties to UNCLOS may submit to the jurisdiction
of ITLOS by agreement in a treaty or other agreement. 95 Article 22 of
the ITLOS Statute also specifically states that parties to a treaty that is
already in force may submit to ITLOS jurisdiction. 96 To date, at least
ten multilateral agreements have conferred jurisdiction to ITLOS. 97
ITLOS' jurisdiction also extends beyond state disputes involving
private parties who agree to submit to the jurisdiction of ITLOS. 98 This

89.

See Noyes, supranote 52, at 120.

90.

Tuerk, supra note 54, at 294-95.

91. John Shamsey, ITLOS vs. Goliath: The InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea
Stands Tall With the Appellate Body in the Chilean-EUSwordfish Dispute, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 513, 515 (2002).

92.

See Noyes, supra note 52, at 130.

93.

General Information, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA (Dec. 7,

2013), http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=8&L=0%252525255CoOpensinternallinkincurrentwi
ndow.

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 22.
97. See Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=l I (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).

THE

LAW

OF

THE

SEA,

98. Noyes, supra note 52, at 130. "[A] literal reading of the Statute of the ITLOS might
allow the ITLOS to hear disputes involving private parties that are submitted pursuant to
agreements conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal." Id.
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is one of the most significant features of ITLOS. 99 Article 20 of the
statute governing ITLOS specifically allows access to ITLOS to state
parties and "entities other than States Parties in any case expressly
provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant to any other
agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by
all the parties to that case."100 This is particularly beneficial in the field
of international environmental law because it would allow NGOs to
participate in matters that they are involved. 0 1 NGO participation in
international environmental issues may also shed light on issues of
noncompliance to the0 2 public, which, in turn, would pressure states to
comply with MEAs.1
In addition, "[i]ntergovernmental organizations may submit
statements to the ITLOS as amici curiae. 10 3 Under Article 289 of
UNCLOS, ITLOS or the parties to the dispute may also seek the advice
of experts regarding the case at issue. 1 4 "International nongovernmental organizations aimed at the protection of the marine
environment do not have access to the ITLOS as parties or amici
289, these organizations can
curiae. ' 1°5 However, under Article
potentially participate as experts.' 06
E. Ability of the Tribunalto Issue ProvisionalMeasures
Under Article 25 of UNCLOS, ITLOS has the power to issue
provisional measures.10 7 UNCLOS Article 290 specifies that where a
dispute has been submitted to ITLOS, and ITLOS finds that it has prima
facie jurisdiction to hear the dispute, the "tribunal may prescribe any
provisional measure which it considers appropriate under the
circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the
dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending
the final decision."' 0 8 Such provisional measures are also binding. 1 9
99. See Shamsey, supra note 91, at 516.
100. International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 20.
101. See Jutta Brunnee, Enforcement Mechanisms in InternationalLaw and International
Environmental Law, http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/brunnee/BrunneeEnforcementMec
hanismslnt lLaw.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2013).
102. Id.
103.

CATHRIN ZENGERLING, GREENING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL

NGOs BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS, TRIBUNALS, AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEES 230 (2013).

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. See also International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 289.
Id. at 230.
See id.
See International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 25.
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 53, art. 290.
See id. See also Noyes, supra note 52 at 135 ("It is beyond cavil that provisional

measures are binding.").
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ITLOS has discretion to revoke any provisional measures imposed only
when "the circumstances justifying
[the provisional measures] have
' 10
exist."
to
ceased
or
changed
To date, ITLOS has utilized provisional measures in five cases. I l l In
MV Saiga (No. 2), a case where ITLOS issued an order prescribing
provisional measures, Judge Laing wrote a separate opinion explaining
the factors to be used in determining whether to prescribe a provisional
measure:
[I]t is useful to recall the discretionary and equitable nature of the
institution of provisional measures. This suggests that urgency
should always be borne in mind as an aspect of any possible
"circumstance." But equally or alternatively should there be
bome in mind such aspects, if they exist as (1) the wrong has
already occurred or cannot be compensated or monetarily
repaired . . . , (2) the certainty that the feared consequence will
occur unless the Tribunal intervenes, (3) the seriousness of the
threat, (4) the right being preserved has unique or particular
special value and (5) the magnitude of the underlying global
public order value, e.g. such possiblejus cogens12values as global
peace and security or environmental protection."
The factors enunciated by Judge Laing in M/V Saiga (No. 2) are
particularly favorable in the context of environmental disputes.
Environmental harm is irreparable and unquantifiable. 113 Thus, the
ability of ITLOS to impose provisional measures using these factors can
act to prevent environmental harm that would be unable to be repaired
or compensated for.
F. Applicable Law of the Tribunal
When deciding disputes, ITLOS must apply the laws of UNCLOS
"and other rules of international law not incompatible with
[UNCLOS]."1 4 Certain portions of UNCLOS "incorporate by reference
'generally accepted international rules and standards' of the
International Maritime Organization." 1 5 UNCLOS also incorporates by
110. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 53, art. 290.
111. See List of Cases, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA (last visited
Dec.
7,
2013),
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=35&L=O%252525255CoOpensinternallinkincurr entwindow.
112. MN Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Order of Mar. 11,1998, 37
I.L.M. 1202, 1224.
113. Berwick, supra note 14, at 265.
114. International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 293.
115. Noyes, supra note 52, at 124.
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reference international law that is not directly related to the law of the
sea. 116

Where non-state parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of ITLOS,
they may also specify other sources of law for ITLOS to apply. 1 7 For
example, the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement provides that disputes
under the agreement be resolved according to the dispute settlement
provisions of UNCLOS. 118 Under the Straddling Stocks Agreement, the
laws of UNCLOS and those included in UNCLOS apply, as well as
"any relevant subregional, regional or global fisheries agreement, as
well as generally accepted standards for the conservation and
management of living marine resources and other rules of international
law[.]''119

G. Enforcing MEAs Through the Tribunal
Although ITLOS was created as the primary judicial organ for
enforcing UNCLOS, it was granted jurisdiction much broader than just
hearing claims brought under UNCLOS. 120 Since ITLOS came into
force in 1994, it has heard few cases but has nevertheless established
itself as an efficient and competent international tribunal. 12 1 The success
of ITLOS can be attributed to its many unique features, which could
also provide a method of improving compliance with existing and future
MEAs.
Portions of UNCLOS, like many MEAs, were drafted ambiguously
1
in order to gain the support of the largest amount of states possible. n
To interpret ambiguous portions and enforce an agreement, binding
compulsory dispute settlement procedures work to hold the agreement
together and maintain its uniform interpretation. 123 Additionally, the use
of binding and compulsory dispute resolution methods, such as ITLOS,
serves as a deterrent for noncompliance asjparties generally wish to
avoid compulsory binding dispute resolution. l 4
ITLOS is currently the largest international judicial body.125 Its
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Id.

119. Id.(quoting Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature
Dec. 4, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.167/37, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995)).
120. See id.at 130.
121. See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 289.
122. See Noyes, supra note 52, at 38.

123. Id.
124. See Seymour, supra note 65, at 3.
125.

See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 290.
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composition is specifically designed to "represent 'the principal legal
systems of the world.'"12 Further, a party in any case before ITLOS
may request that a judge of their nationality hear their case. 127 This
feature makes ITLOS especially capable of hearing international
disputes and ensures that the parties before ITLOS are understood
because someone of their own nationality can participate at the parties'
request.
All decisions issued by ITLOS are binding and final upon the parties
to the dispute.' 28 This feature is also crucial in hearing disputes under
MEAs as it allows ITLOS to decide each case based on the particular
facts of that case. Further, the more decisions issued by ITLOS
regarding disputes under MEAs would serve to clarify and help develop
29
international law, encouraging compliance through understanding.'
The most important feature of ITLOS in enforcing MEAs is its broad
jurisdiction. ITLOS may hear disputes between state parties to
UNCLOS, as well as non-state parties, including private parties,
provided they submit to such jurisdiction.' 30 Participation of entities
such as NGOs in cases of MEA noncompliance serves to bring public
attention to the issue, in turn, pressuring states to comply.' 31
Another feature that makes ITLOS ideal for handling disputes under
MEAs is its ability to issue binding provisional measures.132 In deciding
whether to issue provisional measures, ITLOS specifically considers the
security of the environment. 133 This is crucial in the context of MBA
enforcement as disputes arising under
134 MEAs could likely involve
environmental harm that is irreparable.
ITLOS applies the laws of UNCLOS as well as other generally
accepted international rules and standards.' 35 Additionally, parties to
disputes under MEAs who submit jurisdiction to ITLOS have the power
to specify any particular law they wish to govern the dispute. 136 Thus,
parties to disputes under MEAs in a specific or narrow area of the law
may choose for ITLOS to apply the law of that area, provided that it

126. Noyes, supra note 52, at 126-27 (citing.Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 53,
annex VI, art. 2(2)).
127.

See id. at 127.

128.
129.

See International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 33.
See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 294-95.

130.
131.
132.

See Noyes, supra note 52, at 130.
See Brunnee, supra note 10 1, at 4.
See International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 25.

133.

See MiV Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Ginea), case No. 2, Order of Mar. 11, 1998, 37

I.L.M. 1202, 1224.
134. See Berwick, supra note 14, at 265.
135. See Noyes, supra note 52, at 124.
136. See-id.
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13 7
does not conflict with UNCLOS.

V. TILE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR TILE LAW OF THE
SEA IN COMPARISON

With the recent rise in MEAs, there has also be a rise in the number
of international fora in which environmental disputes may be
brought.1 38 Originally, the ICJ was the most prominent international
tribunal.139 However, since the ICJ was established in 1946, "it has been
joined by a large number of other international judicial and quasijudicial bodies.",40 Two of the largest international tribunals to join the
ICJ include ITLOS and the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. 4 '
A. The InternationalCourtof Justice
The ICJ is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations and has
general authority over any international law question. 142 The ICJ is
composed of fifteen judges, elected for renewable terms of nine
years. 143 "The judges are 'independent' and 'represent[]. . .the main
144
forms of civilization and... the principal legal systems of the world."",
Under the broad jurisdiction of the ICJ, disputing parties under
MEAs may seek formal dispute resolution with the ICJ either by
agreement for the specific dispute or categorically. 145 The ICJ may also
issue provisional measures where it sees fit.'4 6 State parties may choose
to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ by agreement. 4 7 Hundreds of
agreements,
bilateral and multilateral treaties, including 14environmental
8
ICJ.
the
to
authority
resolution
dispute
grant
The jurisdiction of the ICJ, while very broad, is particularly limited
137. Id.
138. See Sands, LitigatingEnvironmentalDisputes, supra note 51, at 5.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See David Scott Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of Non-States in
International Environmental Law, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 475, 479 (1992), available at
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/3.
143. See Mark L. Movsesian, Judging InternationalJudgments, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 73
(2007).
144. Id. (citing Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 9, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, T.S. No. 993).
145. Id. at 73-74.
146. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 41, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. No. 993.
147. Movsesian, supra note 143, at 74.
148. Id.
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in the area of international environmental law because only states may
bring claims before it. 149 "Only states may appear as parties before the
Court."' 150 A private party may only have their claim brought to the ICJ
if the party's government brings the claim on their behalf under the
theory of "diplomatic protection." ' 15 1 Under this theory, the state would
party would result in injury to the
argue that the
52 injury to the private
itself.1
state
The ICJ applies international law including treaties and customary
law in deciding disputes.' 5 3 Decisions rendered by the ICJ are binding
but only bind those parties to the dispute.' 54 "If a losing party fails to
comply, the prevailing party may apply to the Security Council for
assistance; the Council 'may, if it deems necessary, make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to
the judgment. ' 55 Despite the authority of the Security Council to enter
remedial measures against parties who fail to comply with decisions
issued by ICJ, requests for assistance from the Security Council are rare
and the Security Council has yet to enter such remedial measures. 156
Although the ICJ has broad general jurisdiction over international
matters, in 1993, they established the Environmental Chamber of the
International Court of Justice ("Environmental Chamber"). 157 In 2006,
the Environmental Chamber had been in existence for 13 years and had
yet to hear a case.1 58 Consequently, the ICJ decided to discontinue the
Environmental Chamber in 2006.159 Although the Environmental
Chamber is no longer in effect, the general authority of the ICJ does
continue to extend to international environmental issues. 6 0 However,
even with this general authority, few ICJ decisions address significant
issues of international environmental law.161
The162 volume of international law has risen dramatically in recent
As a result, the ICJ's docket has become increasingly
years.

149.

See HUNTERETAL., supra note 4, at 414.

150. Movsesian, supra note 143, at 73.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See Rubinton, supranote 142, at 480-81.
Seeid. at481.
Movsesian, supra note 143, at 74.
Id.

155. Id. at 75 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2).
156. Id.
157. See Sands, LitigatingInternationalDisputes, supra note 51, at 6-7.
158. See Chambers and Committees, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?p1=l&p2=4 (last visited Dec. 8, 2013)
159. See id.
160. See Sands, LitigatingInternationalDisputes, supra note 5 1, at 5.
161. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 414.
162. See Rubian & Wagner, supra note 3, at 463.
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crowded. 163 The ICJ's typical procedure "takes two years to file an
application, twenty to thirty months for oral hearing and four to five
months for judgments to be issues." 164 This lengthy process coupled
with a lack of resources to meet the needs of all international disputants
creates substantial barriers to resolve disputes arising under MEAs. This
poses a particular problem in the context of environmental law because
of the time-sensitive nature of environmental issues and
65 the lack of
adequate remedies for nearly all environmental damage.'
B. The Tribunaland the InternationalCourt ofJustice in Comparison
ITLOS has received criticism as being an unnecessary infringement
on the role of the ICJ.

66

This argument is based on the assertion that the

law of the sea, as a large portion of international law, should be heard
by the ICJ to preserve the unity of international law. 1 7 However, there
68
has been no evidence of such a split in interpreting international law'
and ITLOS appears to be better suited to hear disputes under MEAs
because of it its unique features.
Where judicial fora exist separately without a singular governing
authority, as is the case with ITLOS and the ICJ, each tribunal may
interpret the law differently. 169 Fragmentation in international law
among various tribunals may produce confusion when interpreting and
applying the law.' 7 0 To date, however there has not been a divergence

in interpretation of international law. 1 It is generally accepted that the
opinions of the ICJ are respected among other international tribunals
and that other tribunals will work to develop the law in a cohesive
manner. 172 Further, UNCLOS provides that the law to be applied by
ITLOS, other than the laws of UNCLOS, includes any rules of
international law that are not in conflict with UNCLOS.113 Thus, so long
as ITLOS continues to decide cases in line with established
163. See Samuel J. Zeidman, Sittin' on the Dhaka the Bay: The Dispute Between
Bangladesh and Myanmar and its Implicationsfor the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the
Sea, 50 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 442, 478 (2012).
164. Sang Wook Daniel Han, Decentralized Proliferationof InternationalJudicialBodies,
16 J.TRANSNATIONAL L. & POL'Y 101, 105 (2006).

165.

See Berwick, supra note 14, at 265.

166.
167.

See Boyle, supra note 61, at 37.
Id.

168.

See Rosemary Rayfuse, The Future of Compulsory Dispute Settlement Under the

Law of the Sea Convention, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 683, 687 (2005).
169. See Han, supra note 164, at 111.
170. See generally id.
171. See Rayfuse, supra note 168, at 686.
172. Id.
173. See ITLOS GeneralInformation, supra note 60.
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international law, decisions issued by ITLOS will not infringe upon the
jurisdiction of the ICJ, but rather, alleviate the caseload of the ICJ.
ITLOS, in comparison to the ICJ, is "composed of a body of
[twenty-one] independent members, elected from among persons
enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of
recognized competence in the field of the law of the seas."1 74 The
jurisdiction of ITLOS is not as broad as that of the ICJ, thereby limiting
the issues it may hear. 175 Thus, the expertise and number of judges on
ITLOS allow
76 a more efficient and accessible system for dispute
resolution. 1
The rules governing ITLOS specifically direct that "proceedings
before the Tribunal .. .be conducted without unnecessary delay or
expense.' ' 177 For normal pleadings, the maximum time ITLOS has taken
for any dispute is just over one year. 178 This is a stark contrast to the
179
two-year period it takes to merely file an application with the ICJ.
While ITLOS has only been in operation for a short period of time, it
has proven that its operation is effective. 180 In 2000, former-U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan's stated that ITLOS has "built a
reputation among international lawyers as a modern court that can
respond quickly."5181
Decisions issued by both ITLOS and the ICJ are binding upon the
parties to the dispute for which the decision is entered. Additionally,
both fora may enter provisional measures where they deem necessary.
While there are several similarities between the two such as these, one
of their primary differences is the ability to hear claims brought by nonstate parties.
In contrast to the states-only jurisdiction of the ICJ, ITLOS is open
to all state parties of UNCLOS as well as non-state parties and other
entities including private parties, so long as they agree to be subject to
174. International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 2.
175. See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 294-95.
176. See id
177. Rules of the Tribunal, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, art. 49
(Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basictexts/Itlos8E17 03
09.pdf.
178. See Shamsey, supra note 91, at 517..
179. See Han, supra note 164, at 105.
180. See Zeidman, supra note 163, at 475 (citing Press Release, International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, First Five Years of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
ITLOS/Press 58 (Oct. 18, 2001), available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/

press-releases english/PR No.58. pdf).
181. Id.
182.

See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL

COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ITLOS.html
2013).
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ITLOS' jurisdiction.' 83 This also extends standing under ITLOS to
agreements between states and non-state entities. 84 Additionally,
ITLOS can hear any dispute where the interpretation of an international
agreement is related to UNCLOS. 85
'
C. The World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body
The WTO is the "primary international body dealing with
intergovernmental trade relations."' 86 The WTO regulates trade between
nations. The WTO's goal is to promote free trade by lowering trade
barriers.188 Trade measures are frequently used as a method of enforcing
MEAs, making the WTO Dispute Settlement Body another
potential
1 89
MEAs.
under
arising
disputes
address
to
forum for parties
"Trade friction is channeled into the WTO's dispute settlement
Process where the focus is on interpreting agreements and
commitments, and how to ensure that countries' trade policies conform
with them."' 190 Under the WTO's dispute settlement process, disputing
parties are first encouraged to participate in informal negotiations to
attempt to resolve the dispute. 191 If these informal negotiations do not
192
reach a settlement, a Dispute Panel is formed to litigate the matter.
After the Panel renders its decision, the losing party may appeal, and
following appeal, the decision automatically becomes final.' 93 The
WTO seeks timely resolution of disputes and requires cases be decided
within six months. 94 This method of dispute resolution has allowed
the
95
efficiently.'
and
quickly
disputes
of
numbers
WTO to handle large
In deciding disputes, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body follows the
body of legal rules developed by the WTO.' 96 Additionally, the Dispute
183.

See International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 20.

184. See Shamsey, supra note 91, at 516.
185. See id.
186. Jeffrey Waincymer, Transparency of Dispute Settlement Within the World Trade
Organization,24 MELB. U. L. REv. 797, 798 (2000).
187. See The WTO... In brief The World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/

english/thewto-e/whatis-e/inbrief-e/inbr00_e.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2013) [hereinafter WTO
in BrieA].
188. Id.
189. Brian K. Myers, Trade Measures and the Environment: Can the WTO and UNCLOS
be Reconciled?, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 37, 37 (2005).
190. WTO in Brief supra note 187.
191. See Myers, supra note 189, at 42.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See Han, supra note 164, at 105.
195. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1217.

196. See Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and its Law in the InternationalLegal
Order, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 969, 972-73 (2006).
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Settlement Body has the sole authority to establish the panels that will
hear disputes. 197 The Dispute Settlement Body also has the authority to
monitor compliance with its decisions and "has the power198to authorize
retaliation when a country does not comply with a ruling."'
With respect to the WTO and the environment, the preamble to the
agreement establishing the WTO expresses that parties to the WTO
should pursue the promotion and expansion of free trade "while
allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment[.]"' 99 Despite the WTO's efficient dispute
resolution procedures and clearly stated interest in protecting the
environment, the environmental community expresses very negative
views on the WTO. 200 There are several reasons for the environmental
community viewpoint.
First, WTO's dispute settlement panels are composed of individuals,
operating in their own capacity, who are selected for their work in the
trade community. 20 1 Thus, the panelists are not qualified to address
issues that arise affecting the environment. 20 2 Additionally,
environmentalists argue that because the panelists do not have
environmental knowledge, they cannot appreciate the environmental
factors implicated in international trade and do not give these factors
accurate consideration. 20 3 The WTO's focus is on trade and,
accordingly, the WTO has drawn very strong lines in favor of trade
have been disputes concerning the environmental and trade
when there
20 4
practices.

Second, the WTO dispute settlement procedures allow a minimal
amount of non-state participation, only allowing non-governmental
organizations to send in written submissions regarding disputes between
member states. 20 5 Currently, non-state actors cannot participate directly
in WTO dispute resolution. 20 6 The WTO dispute resolution process

197. See Settling Disputes, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/utw chap3 e.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2013) [hereinafter
Settling Disputes].
198. Id. at 56.
199. HtNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1213.
200. See Winifried Lang, WTO Dispute Settlement: What The Future Holds, in HUNTER ET
AL., supranote 4, at 1219.
201. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1218.
202. See id
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Han, supra note 164, at 106 n.33 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 2-7, WT/DS58/R (Oct. 22, 2001)).
206. See WTO in Brief supranote 187.
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207
favors governments heavily in this way.
Lastly, and perhaps the largest argument against using WTO dispute
settlement procedures for environmental disputes, is that as an
organization centered on free trade, the WTO "will understandably ' try
2 8
to recognize an argument for free trade in virtually any situation. T
The core principle of the WTO is to prevent states from discriminating
against other countries in favor of domestic products or another
country's products. 209 This prevents countries from imposing their own
environmental standards on goods they import such as a standard of
environmentally safe production methods because this qualifies as
discrimination between states under WTO.2 10

D. The Tribunal and the World Trade Organization's Dispute
Settlement Body in Comparison
The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body has many attractive features
including timely and efficient dispute resolution, appellate processes
21
and the power to monitor and enforce compliance with its decisions.
However, the features of the WTO are designed to promote free trade
and not the environment. 212 This inherently makes the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Body incompatible with the purpose of MEAs.
Panelists on the WTO's Dispute settlement body are experts in the
field of trade. 2 13 Comparatively, judges on ITLOS are all experts in the
field of the environment as it relates to the law of the sea.
Further,
ITLOS may enlist the help of outside experts to assist in areas it is
unfamiliar with.21 5
The WTO's dispute settlement procedures do not allow non-state
actors to participate directly in WTO dispute resolution. 216 In contrast,
ITLOS extends jurisdiction to non-state parties where they agree and
allows non-states to submit briefs as amicus curia to the court.Z27 This is
an important feature of international environmental law as NGO
participation promotes 2 18
enforceability of MEAs and in turn,
protection.
environmental
207.

See Lang, supra note 200, in HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1220.

208.

Shamsey, supra note 91, at 519.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1212.
See id.
See Settling Disputes,supra note 197, at 56.
See Shamsey, supra note 91, at 520.
SeeHUNTERETAL.,supranote4, at 1218.

214. See International Tribunal, supra note 53, art. 2.
215. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 53, art. 289.
216.
217.

See Han, supra note 164, at 105-06.
See Noyes, supra note 52, at 130.

218.

See Brunnee, supra note 101.
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Lastly, and most importantly, the primary focus of the WTO is to
liberalize trade. 219 Thus, when a dispute concerns trade liberalization at
the cost of environmental harm, the decision of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body will fall on the side of trade liberalization.220 In
comparison, ITLOS is wholly centered on environmental protection and
issues when issuing
is instructed to consider all potential environmental
22 1
decisions.
final
and
measures
provisional
VI. CONCLUSION

in
Over the last several decades, there has been a dramatic increase 222
pollution.
global
rising
address
to
into
entered
MEAs
of
the number
Despite the amount of MEAs currently in place, the problems that the
treaties were created to address have yet to be solved.223 Current MEAs
are not being complied with and "are one of the leading causes for the
continued degradation of the environment.,, 224 As treaty-based regimes
are the most effective way to deal with international environmental
issues, a solution to the problem of MEA enforcement must be found.225
There are many reasons for the lack of enforcement and compliance
of
with MEAs. 226 Two of the primary obstacles to the enforcement 227
management.
collective
and
congestion
treaty
MEAs includes
Additionally, the lack of compliance can be attributed to the fact that
most MEAs228have only informal and non-binding dispute resolution
procedures.
Historically, informal and non-binding dispute resolution procedures
have been the main form of dispute resolution utilized in international
environmental agreements. 229 However, widespread noncompliance
with MEAs, leading to further environmental degradation, has shown
that new dispute resolution procedures and methods of enforcement
219. See Shamsey, supra note 91, at 519.
220. Id.
221.

See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 53. "Recognizing the desirability of

establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal
order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will
promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their
resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation
of the marine environment[.]" Id.
222. See Rubian & Wagner, supra note 3, at 463.
223.

See Kelly, supra note 2, at 448.

224.
225.

See Rubian & Wagner, supra note 3, at 463.
See Kelly, supra note 2, at 448.

226.

See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1218.

227. See Sands, supra note 36, at 414.
228. See Palmer, supra note 11.
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must be found. To solve this problem, formal and binding dispute
resolution procedures in MEAs
230 are becoming increasingly favored in
the international community.
"ITLOS may become the long awaited environment-friendly
international forum for the future." 31 Since its formation in 1997,
ITLOS has established itself as a modem court providing expeditious
and efficient resolution of disputes. 232 ITLOS' compulsory binding
dispute settlement procedures resolve disputes
using expert judges and
2 33
also provide a deterrent to noncompliance.
The composition of the Tribunal ensures that all global regions and
judicial systems are represented to ensure fairness among the disputing
parties. 4Additionally, ITLOS has proven that it is efficient, timely,
and cost-effective. 235 While ITLOS has only heard twenty-one cases as
of today, ITLOS is relatively new and has received great praise in its
short existence. 2 36 States have also shown a preference for dispute
resolution under ITLOS by incorporating it into other treaties.237
The ICJ, WTO dispute settlement body, and ITLOS have all been
utilized to resolve international environmental disputes. 238 Of these
three, the structure of ITLOS is the most suitable to address
international environmental law. In the context of environmental law, it
is crucial for issues to be addressed as soon as possible to avoid
potential permanent and irreparable environmental harm. 239 ITLOS, as
the largest international tribunal consisting of twenty-one judges with
expertise in areas on environmental law, provides a more efficient and
accessible system for resolving disputes under MEAs. 24 Another
feature that separates ITLOS from the ICJ and WTO is ITLOS'
allowance of non-state actors to participate in dispute resolution.24'
In conclusion, to address the problems caused by noncompliance
with MEAs, stronger enforcement mechanisms must be implemented.
Traditional non-binding dispute resolution methods used in international
environmental agreements were created based on the principles of peace
230.
231.

See Sands, supra note 36, at 412.
Shamsey, supra note 91, at 514.

232.

See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 315.

233.
234.
235.
236.

See Seymour, supra note 65, at 185.
See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 294.
See Zeidman, supra note 163, at 475.
See Cases, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Apr. 15, 2013), at

http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id= 10&L=0.
237. See Andrew Serdy, The ParadoxicalSuccess of UNCLOS Part XV: A Half-Hearted
Reply to Rosemary Rayfuse, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 713, 717 (2005).
238. See Sands, LitigatingEnvironmentalDisputes, supra note 51.
239. See Berwick, supra note 14, at 265.

240. See Tuerk, supra note 54, at 294-95.
241. See Noyes, supra note 52, at 130.
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that MEAs are built upon. However, non-binding dispute resolution
methods have not been effective in implementing and enforcing MEAs.
Thus, to achieve compliance and enforce existing and future MEAs,
parties should consider submitting jurisdiction to ITLOS. ITLOS is
currently being under-utilized but has the potential to provide valuable
resources through its proven expertise and experience in international
environmental disputes. If ITLOS were to be further utilized it would
allow for more disputes under MEAs to be solved and for further
development of international environmental law, in turn, making laws
clearer and easier to follow.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol26/iss2/5

26

Shelver: The Answer to Enforcing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Th

Florida Journal of International Law
VOLUME 26

DECEMBER 2014

NUMBER 3

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
ELYOT XIA-ZHU

Managing Editor
JOHN MOORE

Articles Editors

Student Works Editor

ResearchEditors

JENNIFER FINE
RYAN STRATTON

ASHLEY ESPARZA

BRADLEY CROCKER

LINNEA EBERHART
ERICA GOMER

VANESSA MADRID
ERIC PAKOWITZ

Editor-at-Large
STEPHEN HOLMGREN

General Members
Henri Bardhi
Amanda Bennis
Daniela Berisiartu
Taylor Berman
Maurice Boetger
Carlson Brandt
Kyle Bruno
Brandon Butterworth
Warren Chin
Andres Cordova

Matthew Devisse
Chan Du
Jessica Embree
Melanie Franco
JosefGhosn
Veronica Guerra
Stephen Knight
Jamie Koepsel
Chelsea Koester
Jose Leon
Alex Mclamon

FACUL TYAD VISOR
WENTONG ZHENG

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

Michael Mullavey
Dimitri Peteves
Juan Carlos Rivera
Gabriela Rodriguez
Madonna Snowden
Andrew Spencer
Gregory Toth
David Turkel
Nathalie Vergoulias
Britney Williams

STAFF EDITOR
VICTORIA A. REDD

27

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol26/iss2/5

28

Shelver: The Answer to Enforcing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Th

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The Florida Journal of International Law is a scholarly publication
devoted to timely discussion of international legal issues. Its subscribers
include legal scholars and practitioners from around the world. The
Journal publishes three times a year and is one of four co-curricular
journals produced at the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College
of Law. On occasion, the Journal will also have Special Editions that
can be purchased in addition to its subscription.
The Journal selects its editorial board and staff from the top ten percent
of students at the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law
and from winners of the open write-on competition held once per year.
The Journalenables students to earn academic credit while honing their
legal research and writing skills. Recent articles published or accepted
for publication have treated subjects as varied as International Trade
and Commerce law, Human Rights law, Terrorism, National Security,
War Crimes Tribunals, International Environmental law, International
Intellectual Property, and Maritime law.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2014

29

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5

Florida Journal of International Law

The FloridaJournal of International Law (ISSN 1556-2670) is a
student-edited legal journal published by the University of Florida. The
Journal is published three times per year. The Journal extends its deep
appreciation for the generosity of the University of Florida Fredric G.
Levin College of Law in supporting and assisting the Journal in its
publication of this issue.
Editorial and business address: FloridaJournalof InternationalLaw,
University of Florida Levin College of Law, 351 Village Dr., 218 BrutonGeer Hall, P.O. Box 117635, Gainesville, FL 32611.

Please visit us on the web at www.fjil.org/.
The subscription rate per volume is $55.00 U.S. domestic plus sales tax
for Florida residents and $60.00 U.S. international. Single issues are
available for $20.00 U.S. domestic and $25.00 U.S. international.
Back numbers (volumes 1-25 inclusive) are available from: William S.
Hein & Co., 1285 Main Street, Buffalo, NY 14209.
Manuscripts may be submitted to the Articles Editors:
Florida Journal of International Law
Levin College of Law
University of Florida
351 Village Drive
218 Bruton-Geer Hall
Gainesville, FL 32611
USA
(352) 273-0906
Printed by Western Newspaper Publishing Co., 537 East Ohio St., Indianapolis,
IN 46204

© 2014 FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol26/iss2/5

30

